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I T is very difficult for many reasons to write on Affections of
Speech. So much, since the memorable researches of Dax
and Broca, has been done in the investigation of these cases
of disease of the brain, that there is an embarras de riehesse
in material. To refer only to what has been done in this
country, we have the names of Gairdner, Moxon, Broad-
bent, William Ogle, Bastian, John W. Ogle, Thomas Watson,
Alexander Eobertson, Ireland, Wilks, Bristowe, Ferrier,
Bateman, and others. To Wilts, Gairdner, Moxon, Broadbent,
and Ferrier, I feel under great obligations. Besides recog-
nising the value of Broadbent's work on this subject, I have
to acknowledge a particular indebtedness to him. Broad-
bent's hypothesis-—a verified hypothesis—is, I think, essential
to the methodical investigation of affections of speech. Let
me give at once an illustration of its value. It disposes
of the difficulty there otherwise would be in holding (1)
that loss of speech is, on the physical side, loss of nervous
arrangements for highly special and complex articulatory
movements, and (2) that in cases of loss of speech the articu-
latory muscles are not paralysed, or but slightly paralysed.
I shall assume that the reader is well acquainted with Broad-
bent's researches on the representation of certain movements
of the two sides of the body in each side of the brain; the
reader must not assume that Broadbent endorses the appli-
cations I make of his hypothesis. The recent encyclopaedic
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article on Affections of Speech, by Kussmaul, in Ziemssen's
' Practice of Medicine,' is very complete and highly original.
It is worthy of most careful study.
The subject has so many sides—psychological, anatomical,
physiological, and pathological—that it is very difficult to fix
on an order of exposition. It will not do to consider affections
of speech on but one of these sides. To show how they
mutually bear, we must see each distinctly. For example;
we must not confound the physiology of a case with its patho-
logy, by using for either the vague term " disease." Again, we
must not ignore anatomy when speaking of the physical basis
of words, being content with morphology, as in saying that
words " reside" in this or that part of the brain. Supposing we
could be certain that this or that grouping of cells and nerve-
fibres was concerned in speech, from its being always destroyed
when speech is lost, we should still have to find out the
anatomy of the centre. Even supposing we were sure that the
psychical states called words, and the nervous states in the
" centre for words," were Ihe same things, we should still have
the anatomy of that centre to consider. The morphology of
a centre deals with its shape, with its " geographical" posi-
tion, with the sizes and shapes of its constituent elements.
A knowledge of the anatomy of a centre is a knowledge of
the parts of the body represented in it, and of the ways in
which these parts are therein represented. "Whilst so much
has been learned as to the morphology of the cerebrum—
cerebral topography—it is chiefly to the recent researches
of Hitzig and Ferrier that we are indebted for our know-
ledge of the anatomy of many of the convolutions, that is,
a knowledge of the parts of the body these convolutions
represent. It is supposed that the anatomy of the parts of the
brain concerned with words is that they are cerebral nervous
arrangements representing the articulatory muscles in very
special and complex movements. Similarly, a knowledge of
the anatomy of the centres concerned during visual ideation
is a knowledge of those regions of the brain where certain
parts of the organism (retina and ocular muscles) are repre-
sented in particular and complex combinations. A merely
materialistic or morphological explanation of speech or mind,
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supposing one could be given, is not an anatomical explana-
tion. Morphologically, the substratum of a word or of a
syllable is made up of nerve-cells and fibres: anatomically
speaking, we say it is made up of nerve-cells and fibres
representing some particular articulatory movement.
Unless we most carefully distinguish betwixt psychology
and the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system in
this inquiry, we shall not see the fundamental similarity
there is betwixt the defect often described in psychological
phraseology as "loss of memory for words," and the defect
called ataxy of articulation. A method which is founded on clas-
sifications which are partly anatomical and physiological, and
partly psychological, confuses the real issues. These mixed
classifications lead to the use of such expressions as that an
idea of a word produces an articulatory movement; whereas a
psychical state, an "idea of a word" (or simply "a word")
cannot produce an articulatory movement, a physical state.
On any view whatever as to the relation of mental states and
nervous states such expressions are not warrantable in a medical
inquiry. We could only say that discharge of the cells and
fibres of the anatomical substratum of a word produces the
articulatory movement. In all our studies of diseases of the
nervous system we must be on our guard against the fallacy
that what are physical states in lower centres fine away into
psychical states in higher centres; that, for example, vibra-
tions of sensory nerves become sensations, or that somehow or
another an idea produces a movement.
Keeping them distinct, we must consider now one and now
another of the several sides of our subject: sometimes, for
example, we consider the psychical side—speech—and at
other times the anatomical basis of speech. We cannot go
right on with the psychology, nor with the anatomy, nor with
the pathology of our subject. We must consider now one
and now the other, endeavouring to trace a correspondence
betwixt them.
I do not believe it to be possible for any one to write me-
thodically on these cases of disease of the nervous system
without considering them in relation to other kinds of nervous
disease; nor to be desirable in a medical writer if it were pos-








DISEASE OP THE BRAIN. 807
sible. Broadbent's hypothesis is exemplified in cases of epilepsy"
and hemiplegia, as well as in cases of affections of speech, and
can only be vividly realised when these several diseases have
been carefully studied. Speech and Perception (" words " and
"images") co-operate so intimately in Mentation (to use
Metcalfe-Johnson's term) that the latter process must be con-
sidered. We must speak briefly of Imperception—loss of
images—as well as of loss of Speech—loss of symbols. The
same general principle is, I think, displayed in each. Both
in delirium (partial imperception) and in affections of speech
the patient is reduced to a more automatic condition; re-
spectively reduced to the more organised relations of images
and words. Again, we have temporary loss or defect of
speech after certain epileptiform seizures: temporary affec-
tions of speech after these seizures are of great value in
elucidating some difficult parts of our subject, and cannot be
understood without a good knowledge of various other kinds
of epileptic and epileptiform paroxysms, and post-paroxysmal
states. After a convulsion beginning in the (right) side of
the face or tongue, or in both these parts, there often remains
temporary speechlessness, although the articulatory muscles
move well. Surely we ought to consider cases of discharge
of the centres for words as well as cases in which these centres
are destroyed, just as we consider not only hemiplegia but
hemispasm. Before trying to analyse that very difficult
symptom called ataxy of articulation, we should try to under-
stand the more easily studied disorder of co-ordination, loco-
motor ataxy; and before that, the least difficult disorder of
co-ordination of movements resulting from ocular paralysis.
Unless we do, we shall not successfully combat the notion
that there are centres for co-ordination of words which are
something over and above centres for special and complex
movements of the articulatory muscles, and that a patient can,
from lesion of such a centre, have a loss of co-ordination,
without veritable loss of some of the movements represented
in i t
It might seem that we could consider cases of aphasia, as
a set of symptoms at least, without regard to the pathology
of different cases of nervous disease. We really could not








808 ON AFFECTIONS OF SPEECH FROM
It so happens that different morbid processes hare what, for
brevity, we may metaphorically call different seats of election;
thus, that defect of speech with which there are frequent
mistakes • in words is nearly always produced by local cerebral
softening; that defect which is called ataxy of articulation,
is, I think, most often produced by haemorrhage. Hence we
must consider hemiplegia in relation to affections of speech;
for it so happens that the first kind of defect mostly occurs,
as Hammond has pointed out, without hemiplegia, or without
persistent hemiplegia, a state of things producible by em-
bolism and thrombosis, and the latter mostly with hemiplegia
and persistent hemiplegia, a state of things usually produced
by hfflmorrhage. From ignoring such considerations, the two
kinds of defects are by some considered to be absolutely
different, whereas on the anatomico-physiological side they
are but very different degrees of one kind of defect.
There are certain most general principles which apply, not
only to affections of speech, but also to the commonest variety
of paralysis, to the simplest of convulsive seizures, and to
cases of insanity.
The facts that the speechless patient is frequently reduced to
the use only of the most general propositions " yes " or " no,"
or both; that he may be unable to say " no " when told,
although, he says it readily in reply to questions requiring
dissent; that he may be able ordinarily to put out his tongue
well, as for example to catch a stray crumb, and yet unable to
put it out when he tries, after being asked to do so; that he
loses intellectual language and not emotional language; that
although he does not speak, he understands what we say to
him; and many other facts of the same order, illustrate exactly
the same principle as do such facts from other cases of disease
of the nervous system as—that in hemiplegia the arm suffers
more than the leg; that most convulsions beginning unila-
terally begin in the index finger and thumb; that in cases of
post-epileptio insanity there are degrees of temporary reduction
from the Jeast towards the most " organised actions," degrees
proportional to the severity of the discharge in the paroxysm,
or rather to the amount of exhaustion of the highest centres
produced by the discharge causing the paroxysm. In all
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these cases—except in the instance of convulsion, which,
however, illustrates the principle in another way—there are,
negatively, degrees of loss of the most voluntary processes with,
positively, conservation of the next most voluntary or next more
automatic; otherwise put, there are degrees of loss of the
latest acquirements with conservation of the earlier, especially
of the inherited, acquirements ; speaking of the physical side,
there are degrees of loss of function of the least organised
nervous arrangements with conservation of function of the more
organised. There is in each reduction to a more automatio
condition: in each there is Dissolution, using this term as
Spencer does, as the opposite of Evolution.1
In defects of speech we may find that the patient utters instead
of the word intended a word of the same class in meaning, as
"worm-powder" for "cough-medicine"; or, in sound, as "para-
sol" for " castor oiL" The presumption is that the patient uses
what is to him a more " organised " or " earlier" word, and if
so, Dissolution is again seen. But often there is no obvious
relation of any Bort betwixt the word said and the one appro-
priate, and thus the mistake does not appear to come under
Dissolution. If, however, we apply the broad principles which
we can, I think, establish from other cases of Dissolution, viz.
from degrees of insanity—especially the slight degrees of the
post-epileptic insanity just spoken of—we shall be able to
show that many of the apparently random mistakes in words
are not real exceptions to the principle of Dissolution.
For the above reasons I shall make frequent references to
other classes of nervous disease. The subject is already
complex without these excursions, but we must face the
complexity. Dr. Curnow has well said {Medical Times and
Gazette, Nov. 29, p. 616), " The tendency to appear exact by
disregarding the complexity of the factors is the old failing in
our medical history."
1
 Here I must acknowledge my great indebtedness to Spencer. The fecta
stated in the text seem to me to be illustrations -from actual oases of disease, of
conclusions he liaa arrived at deductively in his Ptychology. It is not affirmed
that we have the exact opposite of Evolution from the apparently brutal doings
of disease; the proper opposite is seen in healthy senescenae, as Spenoex has
shown. But from disease there k, in general, the corresponding opposite of
Evolution.
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Certain provisional divisions of our subject must be made.
The reader is aaked to bear in mind that these are admittedly-
arbitrary ; they are not put forward as scientific distinctions.
Divisions * and Arrangements are easy, Distinctions and Classi-
fications are difficult. But in the study of a very complex
matter, we must first divide, and then distinguish. This is
not contradictory to what was said before on the necessity
of encountering the full complexity of our subject. Harm
comes, not from dividing and arranging, but from stopping
in. this stage, from taking provisional divisions to be real
distinctions, and putting forward elaborate arrangements,
with divisions and subdivisions, as being classifications. In
other words, we shall, to start with, consider our subject
empirically, and afterwards scientifically; we first arbitra-
rily divide and arrange for convenience of obtaining the
main facts which particular cases supply, and then try to
classify the facts, in order to show their true relations one
to another, and consider them on the psychical side as
defects of mind, and on the physical side as defects of
the nervous system. Empirically we consider the cases of
affection of speech we meet with, as they approach certain
nosological types (most frequently occurring cases), scien-
tifically we classify the facts thus obtained, to show how
affections of speech are departures from what we know of
healthy states of mind and body. The latter study is of
the cases as they show different degrees of nervous Disso-
lution.
Let us first of all make a very rough popular division.
When a person "Talks" there are three things going on—
Speech, Articulation, and Voice. Disease can separate them.
Thus from disease of the larynx, or from paralysis of its
1 u
 How often would controversies be sweetened were people to remember that
' Distinctions aud Divisions are very dtfforent things,1 and that ' one of them is
the most nooeseary and conducive to true knowledge that can be: the other,
when made too tnueb of, serves only to puzzle and confuse the understanding.'
Looke's wordi are the germ of that wise aphorism of Coleridge: ' It is a dull or
obtose mind that must divide in order to distinguish ; bat it is a still worse that
distinguishes in order to divide.' And if we catt oar eyes back over time, it U
the same spirit as that which led Anaxagoras to say,' Things in this one con-
nected world are not cutoff from one another as if with a hatchet.'"—Wettmtntter
Beviea (art. Locke), January 1877 (no italics in original).
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nerves, we have loss of voice, but articulation and speech
remain good. Again, in complete paralysis of the tongue,
lips, and palate, articulation is lost, but speech is not even
impaired; the patient remains able to express himself in
writing, which shows that he retains speech—internal speech
—that he propositionises welL LaRtly, in extensive disease
in a certain region in one half of the brain (left half
usually) there is loss of speech, internal and external, but
the articulatory muscles move well.
Let us make a wider division. Using the term Language,
we make two divisions of it, Intellectual and Emotional. The
patient, whom we call speechless (he is also defective in pan-
tomime), has lost intellectual language and has not lost
emotional language.
The kind of case we shall consider first is that of a man
who has lost speech, and whose pantomime is impaired, but
whose articulatory muscles move well, whose vocal organs
are Bound, and whose emotional manifestations are un-
affected. This is the kind of case to be spoken of as No. 2
(p. 314).
The term Aphasia has been given to affections of speech by
Trousseau; it is used for defects as well as for loss of speech.
I t.hinV the expression Affections of Speech (including defects
and loss) is preferable. Neither term is very good, for there
is, at least in many cases, more than loss of speech ; pantomime
is impaired; there is often a loss or defect in symbolising
relations of things in any way. Dr. Hamilton proposes the
term Asemasia, which seems a good one. He derives it " from
d and (rqfiaivco, an inability to indicate by signs o* language."
It is too late, I fear, to displace the word aphasia. Aphasia
will be sometimes used as synonymous with Affections of Speech
in this article.
We must at once say briefly what we mean by speech, in
addition to what has been said by implication when excluding
articulation, as this is popularly understood, and voice. To
speak is not simply to utter words, it is to propositionise. A
proposition is such a relation of words that it makes one new
meaning; not by a mere addition of what we call the separate
meanings of the several words ; the terms in a proposition are
VOL. i. v
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modified1 by each other. Single words are meaningless, and so
is any unrelated succession of words. The unit of speech is a
proposition. A single word is, or is in effect, a proposition, if
other words in relation are implied. The English tourist at a
French table d'hdte was understood by the waiter to be asking
for water when his neighbours thought he was crying " oh 1"
from distress. It is from the use of a word that we judge of
its prepositional value. The words " yes " and " no" are
propositions, but only when used for assent and dissent; they
are used by healthy people interjectionally as well as pro-
positionally. A speechless patient may retain the word " no,"
and yet have only the interjectional or emotional, not the
propositional, use of it; he utters it in various tones as
signs of feeling only. He may have a propositional use of it,
but yet a use of it short of that healthy people have, being
able to reply " no," but not to say "no " when told; a speech-
less patient may have the full use of it. On the other hand,
elaborate oaths, in spite of their propositional structure, are
not propositions, for they have not, either in the mind of the
utterer or in that of the person to whom they are uttered, any
meaning at all; they may be called " dead propositions."
The speechless patient may occasionally swear. Indeed he
may have a recurring utterance, e.g. " Come on to me," which
is propositional in structure but not, to him, propositional in
use; he utters it on any occasion, or rather on no occasion,
but every time he tries to speak.
Loss of speech is therefore the loss of power to proposi-
tionise. It is not only loss of power to propositionise aloud
(to talk), but to propositionise either internally or externally,
and it may exist when the patient remains able to utter some
few words. We do not mean, by using the popular term
power, that the speechless man has lost any " faculty" of
speech or propositionising; he has lost those words which
serve in speech, the nervous arrangements for them being
destroyed. There is no "faculty" or "power" of speech
apart from words revived or revivable in propositions, any
more than there is a " faculty" of co-ordination of move-
1
 On this matter see an able article in the CornhOX Magaiine, May 1866. See
also Waitz, ' Anthropology ' (Collingwood's Translation), p. 241 et ttq.
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ments apart from movements represented in particular way*.
We must here say too that besides the use of words in
speech there is a service of words which is not speech;
hence we do not use the expression that the speechless
man has lost words, but that he has lost those words which'
serve in speech. In brief, SpeechlessnesR does not mean
entire Wordlessness.
It is well to insist again that speech and words are psychical
terms; words have of course anatomical substrata or bases
as all other psychical states have. We must as carefully
distinguish •betwixt words and their physical bases, as we
do betwixt colour and its physical basis; a psychical state
is always accompanied by a physical state, but neverthe-
less the two things have distinct natures. Hence we must
not say that the " memory of words" is a function of any
part of the nervous system, for function is a physiological
term (vide infra). Memory or any other psychical state arises
during not from—if "from" implies continuity of a psychical
state with a physical state—functioning of nervous arrange-
ments, which functioning is a purely physical thing—a dis-
charge of nervous elements representing some impressions and
movements. Hence it is not to be inferred from the rough
division we just made of the elements of " talking," and from
what was said of their " separation" by disease, that there
is anything in common even for reasonable contrast, much
less for comparison, betwixt loss of speech (a psychical loss)
.and immobility of the articulatory.muscles from, say disease
of the medulla oblongata, as in " bulbar paralysis " (a physical
loss). As before said, we must not classify on a mixed method
of anatomy, physiology, and psychology," any more than we
should classify plants on a mixed natural and empirical
method, as exogens, kitchen-herbs, graminaceffi, and shrubs.
The things comparable and contrastable in the rough division
are (1) the two physical losses: (a) loss of function of certain
nervous arrangements in the cerebrum, which are not speech
(words \ised in speech), but the anatomical substrata of speech;
and (6) loss of function of nervous arrangements in the
medulla oblongata. (2) The comparison, on the psychical
side, fails. There is no psychical loss in disease of the medulla
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oblongata to compare with loss of words, as this part of the
nervous system, at least as most suppose,1 has no psychical
side; there is nothing psychical to be lost when nervous
arrangements in the medulla oblongata are destroyed.
• The affections of speech met with are very different in
degree and kind, for the simple reason that the exact position
of disease in the brain and its gravity differ in different
cases; different amounts of nervous arrangements in different
positions are destroyed with different rapidity in different
persons. There is, then, no single well-defined " entity "—
loss of speech or aphasia—and thus, to state the matter for
a particular practical purpose, such a question as, " Can an
aphasio make a will ?" cannot be answered any more than
the question, " Will a piece of string reach across this room ?"
can be answered. The question should be, " Can this or
that aphasio person make a will ?" Indeed, we have to
consider degrees of affection of Language, of which speech
is but a part. Admitting the occurrence of numerous degrees
of affection of Language, we must make arbitrary divisions
for the first part of our inquiry, which is an empirical one.
Let us divide roughly into three degrees: (1) Defect of
Speech.—The patient has a full vocabulary, but makes mis-
takes in words, as saying " orange " for " onion," " chair "
for " table " ; or he uses approximative or quasi-metaphorical
expressions, as "Light the fire up there," for "Light the
gas." " When the warm water comes the weather will go
away," for " When the sun comes out the fog will go away."
(2) Loss of Speech.—The patient is practically speechless
and his pantomime is impaired. (3) Loss of Language.—
Besides being speechless, he has altogether lost pantomime,
and emotional language is deeply involved.
To start with, we take the simplest case, one of loss of
speech, No. 2 (" complete aphasia "}. Cases of defect of speech
(1) are far too difficult to begin with, and so, too, are
those cases (3) in which there is not only loss of speech,
1
 I, however, believe, as Lewes does, that in BO far as we are physically alive,
we ore psychically alive; that some psychical state attends every condition of
ootivity of every part of the organism. This is, at any rate, a convenient hypo-
thesis in tho study of diseases of tho nervons system.
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but also deep involvement of that least special part of
language which we call emotional language. Moreover, we
shall deal with a case of permanent speechlessness. I admit
that making but three degrees of affection of language, and
taking for consideration one kind of frequently occurring
case, is an entirely arbitrary proceeding, since there actually
occur very numerous degrees of affection of language, many
slighter than, and some severer than, that degree (No. 2)
we here call one of loss of speech. But, as aforesaid, we
must study subjects so complex as this empirically before
we study them scientifically; and for the former kind of
study we must have what are called "definitions" by type,
and state exceptions. This is the plan adopted in every
work on the practice of medicine with regard to all diseases.
Let us give an example of the twofold study. Empirically
or clinically, that is for the art of medicine, we should
consider particular cases of epilepsy as each approaches this
or that nosological type ("le petit mal, le grand mal," &c).
For the science of medicine we should, so far as is possible,
consider cases of epilepsy as each is dependent on a " dis-
charging lesion" of this or that part of the cortex cerebri,
and thus as it is a departure from healthy states of this or
that part of the organism. We cannot do the hitter fully
yet, but the anatomico-physiological researches of Hitzig
and Terrier have marvellously helped us in this way of
studying epilepsies, as also have the clinical researches of
Broadbent, Oharcot, Duret, Carville, and others.1
The following are brief and dogmatic statements about a
condition which is a common one—the kind of one we call
loss of speech, our second degree (No. 2) of Affection of
1
 See Moxon, On the Necessity for a Clinical XomeDolature of Disease,
Guy's Hospital Beportt, TOI. XV. In this paper Hoxon shows conclusively the
necessity of keeping the clinical, or what is abovo called empirical—not using
that tcnn in its popular bad signification—and scientific studies of disease distinct.
After reading this paper, my eyes were opened to the confusion which results
from mixing the two kinds of study. It is particularly important to have both
an empirical arrangement and a scientific classification of cases of Insanity. An
examplo of the former is the much-oriticised arrangement of Skae ; the scientific
classification of oases of insanity, like that of affections of speech, would be regard-
ing them as instances of Dissolution ; the Dissolution in insanity begins in the
highest and most oomplox of all corobral norvous arrangemonta, the Dissolution
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Language. The statements are about two equally important
things; (1) of what the patient has lost in Language—his
negative condition, and (2) of what he retains of Language—
his positive condition. Here, again, is an illustration of a
general principle which is exemplified in many if not in all
cases of nervous disease, and one of extreme importance when
they are scientifically considered as instances of nervous
Dissolution. We have already stated the duality of many
symptomatic conditions in the remarks on p. 308. Without
recognising the two elements in all cases of affections of speech,
we shall not be able to classify affections of speech methodically.
If we do not recognise the duplex (negative and positive)
condition, we cannot possibly trace a relation betwixt Nos. 1,
2, and 3 (p. 314). There can be no basis for comparison betwixt
the wrong utterances in No. 1 and the non-utterances in Nos.
2 and 3—betwixt a positive and a negative condition—betwixt
speech, however bad, and no speech. There is a negative
and a positive condition in each degree; the comparison is
of the three degrees of the negative element and the three
degrees of the positive element; the negative and positive
elements vary inversely. The condition of the patient
No. 1, who made such mistakes as saying " chair " for " table "
was duplex; (a) negatively in not saying " table," and (b)
positively, in saying " chair " instead; there is in such a case
loss of some speech, with retention of the rest of speech. Hence
the term defect of speech applied to such a case is equivocal; it
is often used as if the actual utterance was the direct result
of the disease. The utterance is wrong in that the words
of it do not fit the things intended to be indicated; but it
is the best speech under the circumstances, and is owing
to activity of healthy (except perhaps slightly unstable)
nervous elements. The real, the primary, fault is in the nervous
elements which do not act, which are destroyed, or are for the
time hors de combat. If then we compare No 1 with No. 2, we
causing affoctionj of speech in a lower series. The ono kind of classification is
fjr diagnosis (for direct ''practical purposes"), the other is for inoreuse of know-
ledge, and is worthless for immediate practical purposes. The fault of somo
classifications of insanity is that they are mixed, partly empirical and portly
scientific.
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compare the two negative conditions, the inability to say
" table," &o. (the loss of some speech) in No. 1, with the loss of
nearly all speech in No. 2, saying the latter is a greater degree
of the former, and we compare the two positive conditions, the
retention of inferior speech (the wrong utterances) in No. 1,
with in No. 2 the retention of certain recurring utterances
and with the retention of emotional language, saying the
latter is a minor or lower degree of language than the former.
Unless we take note of the duplex condition in imperception
(delirium and ordinary insanity), we shall not be able to
trace a correspondence betwixt it and other nervous diseases.
There are necessarily the two opposite conditions in all degrees
of mental affections, from the slightest " confusion of thought"
to dementia, unless the dementia be totaL
THE PATIENT'S NEGATIVE CONDITION.
(1) Me does not speak.—He can, the rule is, utter some
jargon, or some word, or some phrase. With rare exceptions,
the utterance continues the same in the same patient: we call
these Recurring Utterances. The exceptions to the statement
that he is speechless are two. (a) The recurring utterance
may be "yes," or "no," or both. These words are propositions
when used for assent or dissent, and they are so used by some
patients who are for the rest entirely speechless, (b) There
are Occasional Utterances. Under excitement the patient may
swear: this is not speech, and is not exceptional; the oath
means nothing ; the patient cannot repeat it, he cannot " say "
what he has just " uttered." Sometimes, however, a patient,
ordinarily speechless, may get out a phrase appropriate to some
simple circumstance, such as "good-bye" when a friend is
leaving. This is an exception, but yet only a partial excep-
tion; the utterance is not of high speech value;1 he cannot
1
 What is meant by an utterance of high speech value and by inferior speech
will later on be stated more fully than has been juat now stated by implication.
When we cease dealing with our subject empirically and treat it scientifically, we
hope to show that these so-called exceptions come in place under the principle of
Dissolution. We mny now Bay that speech of high value, or superior speech,
is new Bpeeoh, not necessarily, new words and possibly not new combinations of
words; propositions symbolising relations of images now to the speaker, as in care-
fully describing something novel. It is the latest propositinnising. By inferior
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" say " it again, cannot repeat it when entreated; it is inferior
speech, little higher in value than swearing. However, some-
times a patient, ordinarily speechless, may get out an utterance
of high speech value; this is very rare indeed.
(2) He cannot write ; that is to say, he cannot express himself
in writing. This is called Agraphia (William Ogle). It is,
I think, only evidence of the loss of speech, and might have
been mentioned in the last paragraph. Written words are
symbols of symbols. Since he cannot write, we see that the
patient is speechless, not only in the popular sense of being
unable to talk, but altogether so ; he cannot speak internally.
There is no fundamental difference betwixt external and
internal speech; each is propositionising. If I say " gold is
yellow " to myself, or think it, the proposition is the same;
the same symbols referring to the same images in the same
relation as when I say it aloud. There is a difference, but it
is one of degree; psychically "faint" and "vivid," physi-
cally " slight " and " strong " nervous discharges. The
speechless patient does not write because he has no proposi-
tions to write. The speechless man may write in the sense of
penmanship; in most cases he can copy writing, and can
usually copy print into writing, and very frequently he can
sign his name without copy. Moreover he may write in a
fashion without copy, making, or we may say drawing, a
meaningless succession of letters, very often significantly the
simplest letters, pothooks. His handwriting may be a very
bad scrawl, for he may have to write with.his left hand. Hig
inability to write, in the sense of expressing himself, is loss
of speech; bis ability to make (" to draw") letters, as in
copying, &c, shows that his " image series " (the materials of
his perception) is not damaged.
Theoretically there is no reason why he should not write
music without copy, supposing of course that he could have
done that when well; the marks (artificial images) used in
noting music, have no relation to words any way used. On
this matter I have no observations. Trousseau writes in his
ipeoch is meant utterances like, " Very well," " I don't think BO," ready fitted
to very simple and common ciroumitanoCB, the neryoua arrangements for them
being well organised.
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Lecture on Aphasia (Syd. 8oc. Trans, vol. i. p. 270), "Dr.
Lasegue knew a musician who was completely aphasic, and
who could neither read nor write, and yet could note down a
musical phrase sung in his presence."
(3) In most cases the speechless patient cannot read at all,
obviously not aloud, but not to himself either, including what
he has himself copied. We suppose our patient cannot read.
This is not from lack of sight, nor is it from want of percep-
tion ; his perception is not itself in fault, as we shall see
shortly.
(4) His power of making signs is impaired (pantomimic
propoaitionising). We must most carefully distinguish panto-
mime from gesticulation. Throwing up the arms to signify
" higher up," pantomime, differs from throwing up the arms
when surprised, gesticulation, as a proposition does from an
oath.
So far we have, I think, only got two things, loss of speech
(by simple direct evidence, and by the indirect evidence of.
non-writing and non-reading) and defect of pantomime. There
are in some cases of loss of speech other inabilities; the
most significant are that a patient cannot put out his tongue
when he tries, or execute other movements he is told, when
he can move the parts concerned in other ways quite welL
THE PATIEHT'S POSITIVE CONDITION.
(1) He can understand what we say or read to him ; he
remembers tales read to him. This is important, for it proves
that, although Speechless, the patient is not Wordless. The
hypothesis is that words are in duplicate; and that the
nervous arrangements for words used in speech lie chiefly in
the left half of the brain; that the nervous arrangements for
words used in understanding speech (and in other ways) lie in
the right also. Hence our reason for having used such expres-
sions as " words serving in speech ;" for there is, we now see,
another way in which they serve. When from disease in the
left half of the brain speech is lost altogether, the patient under-
stands all we say to him, at least on matters simple to him.
Further it is supposed that another use of the words which re-
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main is the chief part of that service of words which in health
precedes speech; there being an unconscious or subconscious
revival of words in relation before that second revival which
ia speech. Coining a word, we may say that the process of
Verbalising is dual; the second "half" of it being speech.
It is supposed also that there is an unconscious or sub-
conscious revival of relations of images, before that revival
of images in relation which is Perception.
(2) His articulatory organs move apparently well in eating,
drinking, swallowing, and also in such utterances as remain
always possible to him (recurring utterances), or in those
which come out occasionally. Hence his speechlessness is not
owing to disease of those centres in the medulla oblongata for
immediately moving the articulatory muscles; for in other
cases of nervous disease, when these centres are so damaged
that the articulatory muscles are so much paralysed that
talking is impossible, the patient remains able to speak (to pro-
positionise) as well as ever; he has internal speech, and can
write what he speaks.
The following dicta may be of use to beginners. Using the
popular expression " talk," we may say that if a patient does
not talk because bis brain is diseased, he cannot write (express
himself in writing), and can swallow well; if he cannot talk
because his tongue, lips, and palate are immovable, he can
write well and cannot swallow well.
(3) His vocal organs aot apparently well; he may be able
to sing.
(4) His emotional language is apparently unaffected.
He smiles, laughs, frowns, and varies his voice properly. His
recurring utterance comes out now in one tone and now in
another, according as he is vexed, glad, &c.; strictly we should
say he sings his recurring utteranoe; variations of voice being
rudimentary song (Spencer); he may be able to sing in the
ordinary meaning of that term. As stated already, he may
swear when excited, or get out more innocent interjections,
simple or compound (acquired parts of emotional language).
Although he may be unable to make any but the simplest
signs, he gesticulates apparently as well as ever, and pro-
bably he does so more frequently and more copiously than he
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U8ed to do. His gesticulation draws attention to. his needing
something, and his friends guess what it is. His friends often
erroneously report their guessing what he wants when his
emotional manifestations show that he is needing something,
as his expressing what thing it is that he wants.
So far for the negative and positive conditions of Language
in our type case of Loss of Speech—No. 2 in Defect of Lan-
guage.
Words are in themselves meaningless, they are only symbols
of things or of " images " of things; they may be said to have
meaning "behind them." A proposition symbolises a par-
ticular relation of some images.1
We must then briefly consider the patient's condition in
regard to the images symbolised by words. For although we
artificially separate speech and perception, words and images
co-operate intimately in most mentation. Moreover, there is a
morbid condition in the image series (Imperception), which
corresponds to aphasia in the word series. The two should be
studied in relation.
The speechless patient's perception (or "recognition," or
" thinking " of things) (propositions of images) is unaffected,
at any rate as regards simple matters. To give examples: he
will point to any object he knew before his illness which we
name; he recognises drawings of all objects which he knew
before his illness. He continues able to play at cards or
dominoes; he recognises handwriting, although he cannot read
the words written; he knows poetry from prose, by the different
endings of the lines on the right Bide of the page. One of my
patients found out the continuation of a series of papers in a
magazine volume, and had the right page ready for her hus-
band when he returned from his work; yet she, since her ill-
1
 The term " image" is uaed in a psychical seme, as the term "word" Is.
It does not mean " visual"' images only, but covers all mental states which
represent thing*. Thns we speak of auditory images. I believe this is the way
in whioh Taine uses the term image. What is hero called " an image" is some-
times spoken of as " a perception." In this arliole the term perception is used
for a proceu, for a " proposition of images," as speech is used for propositions,
i.e. particular inter-relations of words. The expression " organised image" is
used briefly for " image, the nervous arrangemenU for which are organised," cor-
respondingly for " organised word," Ac.
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ness, could not read a word herself, nor point to a letter, nor
could she point to a figure on the clock. There is better and
simpler evidence than that just adduced that the image series
is unaffected; the foregoing is intended to show that the
inability to read is not due to loss of perception nor to non-
recognition of letters, &c, as particular marks or drawings.,
but to loss of speech. Written or printed words cease to be
symbols of words used in speech for the simple reason that
those words no longer exist to be symbolised; the written
or printed words are left as symbols of nothing, as mere
odd drawings. The simplest example showing the image
series to be undamaged is that the patient finds his way
about; this requires preconception, that is " propositions of
images " of streets, &c. Moreover, the patient can, if he retains
the prepositional use of "yes" and "no," or if he has the
equivalent pantomimic symbols, intelligently assent or dissent
to simple statements, as that "Racehorses are the swiftest
horses," showing that he retains organised nervous arrange-
ments for the images of the things " swiftness " and " horse ";
this has already been implied when it was asserted that he
understands what we say to him, a process requiring not some
of his words only, but also some of his " images " of things, of
which the words are but symbols.
Such facts as the above are sometimes addaced as showing
that the patient's " memory " is unaffected. That expression
iB misleading, if it implies that there is a general faculty of
memory. There is no faculty of memory apart from things
being remembered; apart from having, that is, now and
again, these or those words, or images, or actions (faintly
or vividly). We may say he has not lost the- memory of
images, or, better, that he has the images actually or poten-
tially ; the nervous arrangements being intact and capable of
excitation did stimuli come to them; we may say that he
has lost the memory of those words which serve in speech.
It is better, however, to use the simple expression that he has
not lost images, and that he has lost the words used in speech.
These facts as to retention of images are important as
regards the writing of speechless patients. The printed or
written letters and words are images, but they differ from
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the images of objects, in being artificial and arbitrary, in
being acquired later; they are acquired after speech and have
their meaning only through speech; written words are symbols
of symbols of images. The aphasic patient cannot express
himself in writing because he cannot speak; but the nervous
arrangements for those arbitrary images which are named
letters are intact, and thus he can reproduce them as mere
drawings, as he can other images, although with more diffi-
culty, they, besides lacking their accustomed stimulus, being
less organised. He can copy writing, and he can copy
print into writing. When he copies print into writing, ob-
viously he derives the images of letters from his own mind
(physically his own organisation). He does not write in the
sense of expressing himself, because there are no words
reproduced in speech to express. That series of artificial
images which makes up the signature of one's name has
become almost as fully organised as many ordinary images;
hence in many cases the speechless man who can write
nothing else without copy can sign his name.
For the perception (or recognition or thinking) of things, at
least in simple relations., speech is not necessary, for such
thought remains to the speechless man. Words are required
for thinking, for most of our thinking at least, but the speech-
less man is not wordless; there is an automatic and uncon-
scious1 or subconscious service of words.
It is not of course said that speech is not required for
thinking on novel and complex subjects, for ordering images
in new and complex relations (t\e. to the person concerned),
1
 The expression "unconucionB reproduction of words," involves the same
contradiction as does the expression," unconscious sensation." Such expressions
may be taken to mean that energising of lower, more organised, nervous arrange-
ments, although unattended by any sort of conscious state, js essential for, and
leads to, particular energiringB of the highest and least organised—the now-
organising—nervous arrangements, which last-mentioned energising is attended
by consciousness. I, however, think (as Lewes does) that some consciousness or
" sensibility " attends energising of all nervous arrangements (I use the term sub-
conscious for slight consciousness). In cases where from disease the highest
nervous arrangements are suddenly placed hon de oombat, as in sudden delirium,
the next lower spring into greater activity; and then, what in health was a
subordinate suboonsciousness, becomes a vivid consciousness, and is also the
highest consciousness thure then can be.
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and thus the process of perception in the speechless, but
not wordless, man may be defective in the sense of being
inferior from lack of co-operation of speech: it is not itself
in fault, it is left unaided.
To understand anything novel and complex said to him,
the healthy man speaks it to himself, e.g. repeats, often aloud,
complex directions of route given to him.
The word " thing " has not been used as merely synonymous
with " substance" ; nor is it meant that anybody has nervous
arrangements for the images of " swiftness" and " horse,"
but only for images of some swiftly-moving thing or things,
and for images of some particular horse or horses.
It may be well here to give a brief recapitulation of some
parts of our subject and, also very briefly, an anticipation of
what is to come; the latter is given partly as an excuse for
having dwelt in the foregoing on some points not commonly
considered in such an inquiry as this, and partly to render
clearer some matters which were only incidentally referred to.
The division into internal and external speech (see p. 318)
is not that just made into the dual service of words. Internal
and external speech differ in degree only: such a difference
is insignificant in comparison with that betwixt the prior
unconscious, or subconscious, and automatic reproduction of
words and the sequent conscious and voluntary reproduction
of words; the latter alone is speech, either internal or external.
Whether I can show that there is this kind of duality or
not, it remains certain that our patient retains a service of
words, and yet ordinarily uses none in speech. The retention
of that service of words which is not a speech use of words, is
sometimes spoken of as a retention of "memory of" words, or
of " ideas of" words. But as there is no memory or idea of
words apart from having words, actually or potentially, it is
better to say that the patient retains words serving in other
ways than in speech; we should say of his speechlessness, not
that he has lost the memory of words, but simply that he has
lost those words which serve in speech.
When we consider more fully the duality of the Verbal-
ising process, of which the second " half" is speech, we shall
try to show that there is a duality also in the revival of the
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images symbolised; that perception is the termination of a
stage beginning by the unconscious or subconscious revival
of images which are in- effect " image symbols"; that we
think not only by aid of those symbols, ordinarily so-called
(words), but by aid of symbol-images. It is, I think, be-
cause speech and perception are preceded by an unconscious
or subconscious reproduction of words and images, that we
seem to have "faculties" of speech and of perception, as
it were, above and independent of the rest of ourselves. We
seem to have a memory or ideas1 of words and words; having
really the two kinds of service of words. The evidence of dis-
ease shows, it is supposed, that the highest mentation arises
out of our whole organised states, out of ourselves—that Will,
Memory, &c, " come from below," and do not stand auto-
cratically " above," governing the mind ; they are simply the
now highest, or latest, state of our whole selves. In simple
cases of delirium (partial imperception with inferior percep-
tion) as when a patient takes his nurse to be his wife, we
find, I think, a going down to and a revelation of what would
have been when he was sane, the lower and earlier step towards
his true recognition or perception of the nurse.
The first step towards his recognition of her when he was
sane, would be the unconscious, or subconscious, and automatic
reproduction of his, or of one of his, well-organised symbol-
images of woman; the one most or much organised in him
would be his wife. To say what a thing is is to say what
it is like; he would not have known the nurse even as a
woman, unless he had already an organised image of at
least one woman. The popular, notion is, that by a sort of
faculty of perception, he would recognise her without a prior
stage in which, he being passive, an organised image was
roused in him by the mere presence of the nurse; the
popular notion almost seems to imply the contradiction that
he first sees her, in the sense of recognising her, and then
sees her as like his already acquired or organised image
1
 The so-called idea of a word, in contradistinction to the word, is itself a word
subconsciously revived, or revivable, before the oongoiona revival or revivabillty
of the game word, whioh latter, in contradistinction to the so-called idea of a
word, ie tho so-called icord ittel/—the word.
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of some woman. We seem to ourselves to Perceive, as also
to Will and to Eemember, without prior stages, because these
prior stages are unconscious or subconscious. It seems to
me that in delirium the patient is reduced to conditions
which are revelations of, or of parts of, the lower earlier and
prior stages; the lower or earlier stages are then conscious.
They are the then highest or latest conscious states. When the
patient becomes delirious, he takes the nurse to be his wife.
More or fewer of the highest nervous arrangements being
then exhausted, the final stage is not possible; there is only
the first stage ; the reproduction of his well-organised symbol-
image is all there is, and that is all the nurse can be to him;
she is, to him, his wife. The symbol-image is then vividly
reproduced because the centres next lower than those ex-
hausted are in abnormally great activity (note, that there
are two conditions, one negative and the other positive).
There is a deepening of consciousness in the sense of going
down to lower earlier and more organised states, which in
health are mostly unconscious or subconscious, and precede
higher or later conscious states; in other words with loss or
defect of object consciousness, even in sleep with dreaming,
there is increasing subject consciousness; on the physical side,
increasing energising of those lower centres which are in the
daytime more slightly energising during that unbroken sub-
conscious " dreaming," from which the serial states, consti-
tuting our latest or highest object consciousness, are the
continual " awakenings."
It is supposed that the well organised images spoken of—
m efiect arbitrary images, symbol-images, those which become
vivid and are " uppermost" in delirium, and then cease to
be mere symbols—constitute what seems to be a "general
notion" or " abstract idea" of such things as " horse,"
' swiftness," &c.; their particularity (that they are only images
vf some horse or horses, of some swift moving thing or things)
not appearing, because they are unconscious or subconscious;
they served once as images of particular things, and at length
as symbol-images of a class of images of things, as well as
images of the particular things.
At page 319 we spoke of the right half of the brain as
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being the part during the activity of which the most nearly
unconscious and most automatic service of words begins, and
of the left as the half during activity of which there is that
sequent verbal action which is Speech. The division is too
abrupt; some speech —voluntary use of words — is, as we
have seen, when alluding to Occasional Utterances, possible
to the man who is rendered practically speechless by dis-
ease in the left half. Again, from disease of the right half,
there is not loss of that most automatic service of words which
enables us to understand speech. The thing which it is
important to show is, that mentation is dual, and that phy-
sically the unit of function of the nervous system is double
the unit of composition; not that one half of the brain is
" automatic " and the other " voluntary."
Having now spoken of the kind of case we shall consider,
and having added remarks, with the endeavour to show how
the several symptoms—negative and positive—are related
one to another, we shall be able to give reasons for excluding
other kinds of cases of speechlessness.
We are not concerned with cases of all persons who do not
speak. We shall not, for example, deal with those untrained
deaf-mutes who never had speech, but with the cases of those
persons only who have had it, and lost it by disease. The
condition of an untrained deaf-mute is in very little com-
parable with that of our arbitrarily-taken case of loss of
speech. The deaf-mute's brain is not diseased, but, because
he is deaf, it is uneducated (or in anatomical and phy-
siological phraseology undeveloped) so as to serve in speech.
Our speechless patient is not deaf. Part of our speechless
patient's brain is destroyed; he has lost nervous arrange-
ments which had been trained in speech. Moreover, our
speechless man retains a service of words which is not
speech ; untrained deaf-mutes have no words at all. Further,
the untrained deaf-mute has his natural system of signs,
which to him is of speech value so far as it goes. He
will think by fid of these symbols as we do by aid of words.1
Our speechless patient is defective even in such slight
1
 We must not confound the flnger-talk with the "natural" system of signs.
They are cssoutially different No one supposes that words are essential for
VOL. I. Z
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pantomime as we may reasonably suppose to have been easy
to him before his illness. The deaf-mute may have acquired
for talking and thinking the common arbitrary system of
deaf-mute signs (finger-talk), or he may have been taught by
the new method to speak as we do, and thus have ceased to
be mute. But when not taught to speak, he is not in a con-
dition even roughly comparable with that of a man who has
hit speech. No doubt by disease of some part of his brain
the deaf-mute might lose his natural system of signs, which
are of some speech value to him, but he could not lose speech,
having never had it. Much more like our speechless patient's
condition is that of the little child which has been taught to
understand speech, and has not yet spoken.
There is another set of cases of so-called loss of speech,
which we shall not consider as real loss of speech. I prefer to
say that these patients do not speak: cases of some persons
are meant, who do not talk and yet write perfectly. This
may seem to be an arbitrary exclusion. There is in most of
these cases an association of symptoms, which never arises
from any local disease of any part of the nervous system; the
so-called association is a mere jumble of symptoms. Let us
state the facts. The patients are nearly always boys or
unmarried women. The bearing of this is obvious. The so-
called loss.of speech is a total non-utterance, whe/eas it is an
excessively rare thing for a patient who does not speak,
because his brain is locally diseased, to have no utterance
whatever; I do not remember seeing one such case in which there
was not some utterance (recurring utterance) a few days or a
few weeks after the onset of the illness; the absolute pseudo-
speechlessness may remain for months. They cannot be mute
from paralysis of the articulatory muscle, because they swallow
well. Frequently there is loss of voice also—they get out no
sounds except, perhaps, grunts, &c.—and yet they cough
ringingly and breathe without hoarseness or stridor; there is
no evidence of laryngeal disease. Now loss of voice never
occurs with loss of speech from local disease of one side of the
thought, but only that some symbols are essential for oonooptual thought,
although it may be that people with " natural" symbols do not reach that higher
degree of abstract thlnWng which people do who have words.
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brain,. No disease of the larynx would cause loss of speech or
loss of articulation. The patients often " lose " their speech
after calamity or worry. In these cases there is no hemiplegia
and no other one-sided condition from first to last. They often,
after months of not-speaking, recover absolutely and imme-
diately after some treatment which can have no therapeutical
effect, e.g. a liniment rubbed on the back, a Single faradaio
stimulation of the vocal cords or of the neck. Dr. Wilks has
reported a case of " cure" of a girl who had not spoken for
months; she had also " lost" the use of her legs. Knowing well
what was the general nature of the case, Dr. Wilks, by speaking
kindly to her, and giving her an excuse for recovery in the
application of faradisation, got her well in a fortnight. Some-
times the so-called speechless patient speaks inadvertently when
suddenly asked a question, and then goes on talking; is well
again. Sometimes speech is surprised out of her. Thus a
woman, whose case is recorded by Durham, when told to cry
" ah 1" when the spatula was holding down her tongue, pushed
his hand away, saying, " How can I, with that thing in my
mouth?" She then said, "Oh! I have spoken." She was
" cured." I believe that patients, " speechless " as described,
might be " cured" by faradisation of the vocal cords, or by
a thunderstorm, or by quack medicines or appliances, or by
mesmerism, or by wearing a charm, or—not speaking flippantly.
—by being " prayed over."
Sometimes these cases are spoken of as cases of " emotional
aphasia"—-the speechlessness is said to be "caused by"
emotional excitement, because it often comes on after emo-
tional disturbance.
I submit that the facts that the patients do not talk and do
write and do swallow are enough to show that there is no
disease at all, in any sense except that the patients are hyste-
rical (which is saying nothing explanatory), or that they are
pretending. There can be no local disease, at any rate.
These cases are spoken of at length, although they are
excluded, because they are sometimes adduced as instances of
aphasia, or loss of speech proper, with ability to write remain-
ipg. I confess that were I brought face to face with a man
whom I believed to have local disease of his brain, who did not
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talk, and yet wrote well, I should conclude that he did speak
internally although he could not talk. To say that he cannot
speak and yet can express himself in writing is equivalent, I
think, to saying he cannot speak and yet he can speak.
[A further instalment of this article will appear in some
future number of BKATN.]
 by guest on N
ovem
ber 22, 2016
http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
